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1 
WHAT ABOUT SOUTH A~RICA'S ~UfURE? 
by Ann Se1dman 
I. ntroduct1on: No crystal bal ~ Interrelated aspects: lJ 
SA w1thin changing international context; and 2) with1n SA 
II. Impact of chang1ng 1nternational 
collapse of soc1al1st clock: 
dlVlSlOn Of !abot~ and 
A. Westet~n pt~essut~es fat~ "capitalist; r~oad" = cont1nuat1on 
of pa~ pressut~es tha contt~lbute to SA'"s poS'twc.r 
1ndustr1a Iza ·1 on: ~sets of actors: 'Cransnationals; wes'Cern 
governments, especially U Internationa agenc1es 
1. o~ansnationals 
a. viewed SA as r!gional subcenter, a case 
fat~ penetr~at_ing Atr1can continent <note= 2. X 
US, populat1on 5w0 mll!Ion, rich m1nera1 and 
agricultural resources, high ~ates o 
unemployment = cheap labor, largely 
unt a uch ed) U.S ~ _ ,..le J hl-.k-ll-,1~ ~ ~ {k.r e..'\_ 
nt,e....l lt --) ~ t"'- ~ ~'<"+ 
b. transnat1ona1 corpora e investment In SA 
= dominate 1ndustrial and flnancial sectors 
(In close collaboration w1th b~ cased Hnglo 
Amet~lcan Cot~ at~ation, the World's 2~th 
largest TNC~ one of top foreign Investors 1n 
us!) 
c. competl't;ion 
re Ub as dec11ning 
world at~eas: 
t1rst world workers; egs 
lndustries move to th1rd 
(lJ where repressive governments, 
like SA,s, keep dlsciplined low 
wage labot~ force 
(2J divestment: replace ownership 
oy con'C t•act s, t~ed uce t~ 1 s k, Increase 
flex1bllity 
t:: Westet~n govet~nmenti} 
a. l N~-~·:!111 expect econom1c <ana If 
necessary, m1l1tary) suppot~t tram 
govet~nment s, 
b. Frightenin g aspect of Iraq war 
2 
(!)= massive smashing with 
s opn i st I cat ed weapont~y, oack to 
"pt~e-Industt~Ial age; 11 
(c)added on 
N i cat~ag ua, 
expansion of 
to Gt~enada, 
Anjlg_la and 
US mllitat~y In 
Panama, 
genet~a l 
Aft~ica 
agencies~ IIYIF, Wot~ld Bank f inancial 
ot~ •rmat~K et economy" --. Sf\.- "' c. t""""'l!."~ Co-to11-j13·idJ-ul'\ WUn<t<" 
B. f_henges 
suppot~t; <2> 
a. IfYIF gave lat~gest loan In Afr~Ica to help SA 
oalance payments in eatly 1980s; undoubtedly 
nas been advising government since 
(1) Privatization already under 
way: I) = curt~ent govet~nment 
income; I i) r~eouces state 
involvement as blacks seem likely 
to nave greater role 1n gove r nment 
(It f"Ot =. ~ ~r {,,V· ll+ ac.YI' 
b. World Bank waits in wings: note biggest 
World Bank loan to any tnird world private 
project thrugh In~ernationa l ~ Inance 
Corporation was to Limoabwe's Hwangwe Tnermal 
Plant - JOintly owned by Hnglo-Rmerican and 
Zimbabwe govet~nment. ~ t-{1·~.~- .. ~ t1Ao~o-v .. v"""'-
in socialis~ block = 2 aspect <1) loss oi 
com petit: ion: <?( ·-1?1tc a "-.;.,.. 1 fN ~ 
g. Loss of suppot~t) 
a. note that Eastern European countries, 
like Poland, have begun trading with SA 
despite sanctions; Soviet Union has 
established consular relations; 
b. loss of financial support and possible 
source of weapons If forced to return to 
armed struggle; note powerlessness of UbSR re 
I t~aq situation 0::. tt" c. ~f.£¢ ~ot ( ~\'>{.. r M ~ 
c. Ii gain state powet~,and decide to Initiate 
major steps towards socialism, can ' t count on 
kind of t1nancial ot~ milltat~y suppot~t Cuba; 
ot~~Y..§!...!:!.__8ngola, r~eceived; may not even expect 
veto w1thin UN to stop US measures 
2. Som~ce of( gt~owing c::ompet it iorl)fot~ Intet~nat ional 
Investment, markets for exports for relatively labor-
Intensive Industrial output 
I 
III. Wlthin thls context,_....;o;..;.n.;..-ggj_ng 
democratic government 
. -
A. un metnodology for th1s d1scuss1on: no oluepr1nts 
1. can only outline maj.£!:.__F_!t~oblem at~eas; dt~aw on 
ex1sting knowledge of SA situation, to suggest middle-
le~er- explanations <ie deta1led exp anat1ons or the 
causes ot specif1c institut1ona11zed features o f the 
SA~s distorted poli~ical economy and tne way 1t 
Impoverishes the black maJority); and, based on on 
1-itric~ and thit~d wot~Id expet~iences elsewhet~e, 1n0 c~te 
the possible range of spec1fic solut1ons by which 
l1Det~at1on movmement m1gnt, step y step, overcome t em 
2. Futut~e development w111, 1n any event, t~eguit~e 
part1c1patory researc~ involving l1beration forces 1n 
analysiS of pt~ob..!_gms, theit~ causes, and t~ange o f 
possible solut1ons; 1e cl·~eate thecondltions 
- -they can learn tnrough the1r 
an what doesn-; t ----
B. Some of main problems and their causes = o f 2 k1nds: 
~ m e d i at e and 1 on g t e t' m :J 
1. Immediate hindrances to maJOrlty rule constitute 
first pr1or1ty for act1on: 
a. De Klerk government's slow motion 
L'-'t_~~e_r_-o_t_~_m_s_'_' __ = __ l~l_m~i_t~e ' -----------------------------------
(l)haven't even made pt~omlseo 
changes of releas1ng 
d et ai nees,_.- ~~ 1- '101> 
p tical 
1)-V r ~ '3 rnro o-uf 
(2Jonly now letting f1rst of 4~,000 
exiles return <and costs o f 
resettlement are h1gh, espec1ally 
w1th 41Ll1- unemployment>- /:t\1 ~vll • t •tie. \ 
1~, 1 I "30- ,·.,._ ;<;1$\bl (UN I<= V'f'M-'1.- J 
(3) may pass b1lls abo11shing 
existing racial restrictions on 
lano olding etc; out tna.i__po~t/c. rt'f-
remove economic constraints o~· 
African maJOrlty 
~a) doesn't 
oppot~t unities, 
cond1t1ons of 
( 
wot~k 
11ving 
wot~ket~s and 
unemployed 
( 
4 
(b) Note: so far re f orms 
mainly benefit emerg1ng black 
" middle clas s' ( small 
businessmen, in-cellectuals, 
pt'ofessionals) ____ __.,; __ _ 
eoV"Y\~-~w~ .s~ t p (.1161 u. 
·~thnic conflict~ still causi n g many 
deatns, disrupting e~forts to solve ~roblems · 
" 1 
(1) Reflect unoet'lying stt'uctut'al 
consequences of apat'theid, the 
separation of peoples 1nto 
bantustans o y a 11 e g e d " t t' i ba 1" 
affiliations, and pitt1ng them 
against eachother In the struggle 
~or JObs, housing, eoucat1on -- the 
bare necessities of l1fe. 
l2) evidence shows role of pol1ce, 
militat'y, In stlt't'Ing tnese up;:::-.J ~ ro\ h ~ (,\'\ lt... • (, 1, 1 fl'\t ~ J 2,1 ""'-'"'11UTI.,.. 
c. In vet'Y difficult c~t •cumstances, with 
I 
scat'ce funds, personnel, etc., 
liberation forces still trying to et 
own house in or 1~ ;.~\"'\Nt.. "'IVV \ 
1M\ f\LfJ fle:or ~ ~ ~ (1) ANC returned, but problems 
reintegrating with -cnose mi litants 
organized 1n Un1ted Democratic 
Ft'ont (UDt=) wno t'ema1ned; also 
problems defining 1ts own 
positions, eg t'e tutt_we I " 
nat i O):La 1 u:at ion & L~tc ..... c1 i"' "~i f-0~"'"'-l. 
~W ·<.l l-o"~s~·<..'-' ~> hVl~" ' ~ 
(2) Othet' mass democt'at IC movement'._ 
forces working to oefine 
stat us: 
the 1 t' own 
(a) UD F , tederat1on o f 
community groups set up 
early '80s wn1le ANC 
banned, has disbanded, 
members to JOln ANC; 
was 
urged 
will they 
stt'ength UDf-
. v e t' s i t y ? /V tJ!) 
lose 
had 
the 
1n 
ii) Ai\IC, 1n ex1le, 
developed organization 
style; need to work out 
new democrat1c t orms? 
) 
I 
-
..J 
"". ,._n,(/\" vl (b) COSA .. IU, lead1ng mass- \~\ 
based un1on fedet~atlon wi t h t""' t>J-. 
strong commun1~y l1nks, 
outspokenly for social1st 
futur~e, is seat•chlng to de f 1ne 
working class leadershlp role 
( ------------------------------------~ J 
- / (3) Pr~oblem of enough su f f1c1ent l y 
(( 
1
/ qualiiled cadt~es to take ovet~ the 
many tasks required of a modern 
1ndustrial pol1t1cal economy, 
whatever form of government emerges 
<a) Blacks = c'./...:5 of laoot~ 
fot·ce, = 2 m1ll1on wot~ket~s 
w1th shopfloor and trade un1on 
experience, but typically 
den1ed oppor~un1~1es to 
participate 1n any aspect of 
product1on management; 
(b) Systemat1c 
education to 
espectally a~ 
level; 
denial of 
b l acks, 
un 1 v et·s it y 
\-----
<c> Some .::'.0~0 South Africans 
studying 1n US, many more 
elsewhere; but exper1ence 1n 
Zimbabwe shows that when 
return have l1t~le knowledge 
of causes of many prob l ems, 
far less solutions llkely to 
work in SA context. 
d • . Stt~uggle ovet~ const1tution: what k1nd 1s 
required to fac1litate ~rans1t1on to 
aemocra~1c governmental structures 1n what 
in1t1ally w1ll undoubtedly be some Hlnd of 
sta~e cap1tal1st political economy: 
(1) Issues of bourgeois democra~ic 
r1ghts: ~o vote; freedom of 
speech, pt~ess, ot~ganiza~lon to 
defend trade un1on and commun1ty 
struggles for oasic needs; not 
s1mply elections, but create 
partic1pa~ory state structures to 
ensure workers, peasants inputs 
(c'.) Issue of pt~operty - whose and 
. t. 
what k1nd? how to ensure 
sufficient flex1b1lity to permit 
on-going struggle fo r cont1nu1ng 
ratlonally-planned 1nstitut1onal 
change as overcome 1mmed1ate 
constt~alnts-
' ' ,. 
.. 
Longer term problems: Bas1c structural economic issues 
at national, t~egional level-;:: N<UA 1-b ~ld J...M..-L.V-q 1~ ( oru.1 
-= fol\k- 3"{ ""~ dv... ~- ~t{..(. NifW , ~"" 
1. ·~ landquest~ PRitr,n,.~ {fV\sv-t- ~f-~Tf~ 
~~~~ .___. 
.• Y.. a. Q•t~esent statt\j) ,..-. ~ ~\ l (1) 87 Y. of land held by Whltes$~~~~~ 
lnct~easlngly by lat~gest white-owned s-
(many of them cot~pot~ate) ·fat~ms, 
employ1ng several hundred thousands 
of black farm workers, 
(a) produce food for uroan 
domest1c markets, even part of 
bantustan markets; and all 
agricultural exports 
(b) capital-1ntens1ve: squeeze 
out small white fat~ ms., black 
labor = growing black 
unemployment ,.-; f"' ~} ~c· .,....,.. 
~ l ( ("nh.rn"" c;, -~·e-n" ~ 
(c) Large port1on o~ white-
owned land not in use (in 
Zimbabwe, post-lndependence 
studies showed l/3 to 1/~; 
ev1dence suggests similar in 
SA> 
<2> almost half the black 
population (most of the 40~ w1thout 
jobs) crowded into 1~ fragmented 
lnfertile bantustans (homelands) 
Wlthout access to bas1c amenit1es, 
far less land tor productive 
activity 
(b:" Re land questioiiJ A1m to g1ve clacks who 
want to f.:wm access to land, plus inputs, 
extension support, cred1t, and marKets - all 
of wh1ch now favor large wh1te farm owners 
(1) Already, as 
obJeCtions to 
redistr1bution: on 
in Zimbabwe, 
land ma_J or~ 
gr~ounds would 
. I 
reduce product1v1ty, causing high 
prices and hunger 1n Cities, 
reduc1ng rore1gn exchange earnings 
(a) Note 1n Zimbabwe: 
t' eo 1 s t t' 1 b-u-:-t-e-d...,.--a...,...b_o_t_l t~--....l-0"'"-·""'1---o-f 
white owned 1/c ot land, black 
ministers acquired large white 
fat·ms; so-called "mlt'acle" of 
Increased peasant farms (= 
more eff1c1ent than white 
farms) restricted to 1~~ of 
"com munal at•eas" in oes-c land 
zones, wh1le rest of Afr1can 
farmers confront repeated 
droughts, fam1ne = 
1ncreas1ngly 1mpoverisned. 
(2) ANC land comm1t-cee struggling 
w1th 1ssues; don't know current 
sta-ce oT the1r deliberations, but 
evidence suggests l1kel1haod of: 
(a) Measures to provide 
unused wnite-owned land 
(especially abandoned farms 
not best Salls) to African 
peasantsi either as 
individuals or coapera-cives \~ , 
e~ ~~:...------7 (but note need lead"e'r'S'hlf.! and additional g a v et·n m ent s Uf!P.~rt 
1f take coop route; ANC 
leaders don't have too much 
agricultural experience) 
7 
(b) Some of large white farms 
might be turned into state 
fat' m s as ex_P. e t' i m en t a l a 
tt•ai n 1 ng cent et·s, suppot·t fat' 
small olacR farmers; but = 
expensive and require 
pet'S anne 1. 
<c> Hopefully w111 press tor 
adegqate labm• legislat1pji'to 
protect r1Bnt of tarm workers 
on remaining white farms to 
at·gan i_;_e, get adequate 
no u ~n g, m in i m i m 11 v in g 
standard and educat1on; and 
over t1me work for Increased 
p-:_t·tlcipation in manage_ment or' 
2. ,_.lndustr'y: key 
sectors 7 but ~res 
8 
(O) To Sl..tp!:JOr't incl·'eased 
African farming. require state 
I n t ' e t' vent I on i n {!)mat' k e t I n g o f 
ct'~ <note now = white t' un 
marketing boards and coops; 
Africans can't compete, need 
suppor't) @financing (now have 
African Development Bank which 
lends a little to Af ricans on 
need ___ ma.J ot~ 
lil\e xt ens ion 
<almost eWI t'e l.y noD 
wh it e fat' m s ) ; and 
;.:,....:::..r;.~:..::.:.~--~=I=n:;RU t s and 
Afr'Icans <Afr'ica 
operate run most 
of machiner'Y on big far'ms, but 
no experience with management, 
marketing; for peasant 
agriculture, require 
examination of existing farm 
implement manufactur1ng 
industt'Y•) 
to increasing product iVIty In all 
y = dJ.stQ)"'ted, need restl·'uctut~Ing 
Present status? oligopolistic industry = 
~~ 
of state-domestic 
and 
state 
finance houses, 
str' engthening 
M,....Afh.J~~ 
I'~~ sector's 
affected by political 
fall1ng t'eal 
SA population = 
than capacity 
> 
negatively 
economic 
incomes of 
o per~a·c In g 
~) 3 egs to illustrate different 
ownersh i p-managem~ at'r~angement s 
of basic indus~r1es 
(a) Steel : State fi t~m, 
ISCOR, estaolisheo when Nats 
fit~st got powet~ In lS~IZls, 
established 1 r~on and steel 
industt~y, subsidized steel 
, 
f'l ff{i., '"'fill ~ "', ..... 
ltJ fr{YI<>.' 
inputs for local industry; now 
a number of joint state-
pt•ivate tu·ms, With 
technologies rrom foreign TNCS 
<US Steel. now USX, 
eS'"tablished 4 subsidiat•ies 
thet•e; last yeat·, US Impot·ted 
$ 3tZIIZI m 1 llJ..on_ w o t't h of s t e e 1 
products despite sanctions> 
(b) Peb'ochemica!s~ F~q;~n 
oil rms Inc uding Caltex, 
l"lobil, C\Jl.d.,. _ ) -own 
refineries alone or with 
state, import, store oil in 
viola~ion of UN Sanctions; 
Shell-BP together with stat~ 
owned Petrochem makes 
petrochemicals, though 
economies of scale force ~hem 
to import important 
ingredients. Negotiations 
undet' way to buy oil ft'.2.,m 
Angola. 
<c> [""8uto Industt'y: always 
t'eceived state suj:!port, 
t'equu'ecr- TNCs to use 
increasing ~ of local inputs; 
Anglo-Amet'Ican has_acgu~ 
ChrYs:J:ff -- and F- ot'd 
subsidiar'Ies, contt'acts fat' 
technologies etc; GM sold its 
plants to local rirm run by 
its former manager, financed 
In part by GM loan, and still 
buys technology h'Onl Gtvl. 
(3) [smaller' Industt'Iesj 
(a) white owned businesses 
have estaolished smaller 
p 1 ant s I n e n,.g I n e e t' i n g , 
producing !=!arts and materials, 
and 1 ight umet' oods 
1 
i n d us tt· 1 e s ::::- ( 1\ ~ m ~ 1 '1 tLv s ::J!I/Jh I kJ. 
(b) Note textile firms 
lsrael, Hong kong and 
have contracted 
-bantustans to establish 
liZIIZI 11 fact or I es 11 to 
Tt'Om 
!aiwan 
With 
up to 
" ' 
text1les; 1n 
got $7/week 
-7/ht~) 
11£1 
m id-81Zls, wot~ket~s 
<US wot~ket~s got 
(c) bla.s..ks own t~eQ.C\ir shop~, 
s rna 11-~caJ, e _c.Q.et~At 1 on s 1 n 
townships and bantustans ~eg 
shebeens, blacksm1ths to maKe 
small _tools, auto r~epair~, and 
hand1ct~afts, et"C:) 1n an 
unt~e g 1st et~ed "in f ot~ma 1 •· sect at~ 
wh'lch pt~obably pt~ovides at 
least an it~r~egular:._ sout~ce of 
1ncome for a significant 
port1on of the 41£1% or so of 
wot~ker~s excluded-ft~om the 
- -- - ,r -
modern sectot"t::-\,.l/'1\-eA ~ l~ •· 
1' lltS k b. How to transform SA's industr1al sector to 
1 nct~ease Rt~aduc 1 ve emJ;;Jl..l;l~n~t'--~~~·~::.:...:..::.:.:..:...:~ 
and raise liv1ng standards of mass of 
p~E!:llatio.!:!? t~equit~es- long_ tet~m pet~;.gective 
and intet~mediate tet~m plans /11\o~change 
institutions and through them, the~llocat1on 
of 1ndustr1al resources - 1e formulation of 
1ndustr1al strategy and institutional changes 
to implement it. 
<1> 1nged1ents of an i ndustt~ial 
stt~ategy: 
(a) Assess 1mmediate basic 
needs:""!! slgnlrlcant potential 
domestic market 1f ra1se 
Afr1can 1ncomes; requ1res 
maJor changes 1n industr1al 
output to meet needs: 
housing, clo.i.b...Lng, t£!..£d, etc 
(b) Exam1ne chan.es needed in 
to Rt~ovide 
essential 
uct1vity 
in agt~icillut~e, h~ng, 
tt~an~~' and small scale 
1ndustr1es producing 
esse~l consumet~ goods; and 
to pt~ovlde and consumet~ goods 
small 1ndustr1es cannot 
pt•ovide 
(c) Wot~k 
states <tht•ougn SADCC) to 
1ncrease essential tools ana 
materials they cannot produce 
1n exchange for Inputs they 
can, In the context of 
mutually beneficial plannea 
expansion of reg1onal trade. 
( 2) 
1nst1tUtional 
t•ea i ze 
sb·a~gy: 
essent_ial 
uu·ed to 
1ndustt'1al 
<a> Restt·uctm·e m·e.-exlsti.Ilg 
s t aj;,_e t' o l e in bas i c 
in d u~ t' i e.,s, to imp 1 em en t 
1ndustrial strategy, involve 
li\ inct·eased Aft'lcan 
~partici at1on, ootn through 
tra1nin ~nd emRloyment of 
qua11fiea toR-level aersonnel; 
r;:.1and tt•ade union · and commun1ty 
~inputs into dec1s1on-mak1ng 
1) Note: thiS 1mplies 
strong government support 
fat' tt•aae unIons; COSATU fO<"u..J 
'~ govet•nment ro 
· j! considet' . a~~t·opt'late 
, . ....ct~ '"" ' labot' 1egislat1on now, 
5~ ... ~\\J...but th~s has ~o be viewed 
~~ as an Issue or struggle. 
}
\. J~s"< 
'/,-- I I ) I NC aT T I li a -ts,.e s ~ ~ ~ tQke ft'w':.~.(~~ lv ~ wt'h1's't4 
~- ( \r .-, t'e st t•uct ut·• In g, but MDI•I -
ffihlSt · J 8t'eSSJl"f tor 
appropriate government 
g'ihde bnes: eg 
.. 
( 
12 
~ investment in ~ss developed 
r~eglons 
@ wot~k 
stJ·~ategies 
SADCC 
out 
with 
(3) Gvernment support for small 
scale Afr1can businesses ,. 
<indlvidual or cooperative) to I 
pt~ovlde pt~oductive employment~~, 
opportun1t1es at appropr1ate 
staiidat~as and pt~oduce esseni:; 1al 
tools and consumer oods.= research 
re 1nrormal sector 
(4) Government support for SADLL 
product1on and trade agreements to 
fac1l1tate spread of complementary 
industrial1zat1on throughout the 
region 1n the context of rising 
1ncomes and expand1ng regional 
mat~ket s 
Foreign and internal wholesale trade: essent1al to 
fac1l i tate special1 zat ion and exchange 1 ead i ng to mot~e 
balanced, 1ntegratea national and reg1onal economic 
development 
-
remains predominantly 
cnaracterist1c of th1rd world 
countt~lesc), aesp1te its heavy 
industt~y: 1t main!_y sell~minet::als 
and agr1cultural produce to _ US, 
Lut~ope, and As1a, and buys oil, 
advanced technolog1es and weapons; 
b)as a t~eg ·anal sub-centet~, howevet~, 
it sells manufactures to its 
neighbors and 1mgorts ~ne1r crude 
matet~ials 
4. 
1.5 
effectively compete; 
<3> a handful or o.ll!;Lopolistlc SR 
tradin institut1ons, largly t1ed 
to C, dominate the 
the ne1ghbot's' t'egional 
play a maJor role 1n the export of 
ct'ude pt'oduce 
(1) again, wh1le the libet'atlon 
f o t'C e s, even i r they g a 1 ned state 
power, lack personnel to 
immediately impose s~ate control 
over fore1gn and wholesale ~raoe, 
they need now ~o study how tne 
exist1ng trad1ng 1nstltutions work 
ali"d"begin ~o develop a "tt'ade 
stra egy ~ wou 
than ur1Ciet'm1ne, 
stt'ategy. 
(2) Government support for black 
domestic trad1ng inst1tutions, 
es.P.ec1ally coopet'atives, v1a 
tt'ainlng, ct'edl , access to 
suppl1es 
(3) S1multaneously, study~l 
trading institutions and the 
changes required to support a 
regional 1noustrial strategy. 
Ol1gopolistic f1nanc1al control 
a. Present s"tatus SA 
----""'"'"'-""' institutions are c osely houses on 
(1) e . lead1ng banks used 
to be UK Barclays <with AAC owning 
1/3) and UK-Standard; together 
owned 2/3 of oank assets. B~!;.lays 
SA affiliate now = RAC's irst 
National Bank of SA; and Standard's 
SA aff1l1ate also has been 
localized. But t1es and patterns 
of loans t'ema1n same, favot' big 
14 
farms and 1ndustries, etc. 
(2) S1m1lar s1tuat1on for 1nsurance 
cos (leadlng one - AAC>; ouild1ng 
soc1eties; pension funds (= 
impat~tant socn~ces or doilt'estlcally 
generated cap1tal; w1ll discuss in 
Q ~eriA " f anyone interested) 
-
h its board of directors 
includes pt~l vat e nk 
~~---~~-~ 
represen at~ves wh1ch lrnRoses 
fa t~ly stt~ict financ1al contr !Tan 
the rand, fore1gn exchange 
expenditctt~es, etc. <although how 
strictly these are enforced to 
prevent capital r11ght by the 
mining finance houses, I wonder) 
(4) cxistlng tax ROllCleS = 
primarily tax the oar 
black) maJority to 
subsidize the social and economic 
1nfrastruc ure enJoyed 
(white) rich m1nor1ty; w1ll requ1re 
complete revis1on 
to agriculture 
implementation of industrial strategy ? 
<1> Probably don't have personnel 
to national1ze banks immedlately, 
even 1f wanted to, so nee to 
exam1ne how state can use 1ts 
leverage through the Central Bank 
and by other means to pressure 
banks_ and othet~ financ1al 
1nstitut1ons into helping to 
redirect investable surpluses to 
finance proposeo 1ndustrial 
stt~ategy; 
(a) Reexamine centt~al 
fore1gn exchange 
regulations of 
commet~clal banks 
funds to proposed 
t~estt~ucc ut~l ng 
~-.--5-u_m_m_a_t~-y--a-n_c ____ _ 
<b) Note: SA state estaolished 
agr1cultural bank th t 
financed w 1te ~armers; can 
tt~£ -co t~esb~uctLwe that~ but 
need care~ul study; 
~ ~ Vii ~ (r\,o..4 
<c> Consider other special 
banks 
<2) over time, as 
peL~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
(3) Restt~uctut~e taxat1on system = 
important Way to caeture SUrp L S 
plus increase domest1c market 
chang1ng 1ncome d1str1bu 1on 
A. The struggle for state power 1s st1ll In the balance, 
and how It Will turn out depends on the ability of "Ghe mass 
democrat1c movement, especially the ANC and the trade 
unions, to mobilize mass support to force DeKlerk government 
to accept meaningful democratic participation; 
B. l f mass democratic forces win state power, 
Will still need to fundamentally restructure 
Itself, as well as its undet'beat~et' t~ole 
institutions 1n key sectors of tne political 
provide productive employment and rising liv1ng 
~or the mass of the populat1on, 
then t11ey 
the sta"Ce 
In shaping 
economy to 
stancat'ds 
1. lhat requires careful analys1s and step-by-step 
restructuring of the Institutions that dom1nate the 
national commanding heights 
e::. a pt~ocess which Will inevitably take 
1nvolve an on-going struggle of the mass 
time and 
democt'at ic 
a. led by as yet not clearly defined 
alliance of wot~ket~s and peasants, but also 
Involving small businesses and In t ellectuals 
b. hence a prime requisite Will be to 
establish and maintain democrat1c rights to 
organ1ze laoor and otner community 
organizations of all kinds to press for on-
golng changes 
Implications for US working class 1n context of changing 
J. C.l 
1nternational d1vis1on or labor 
A. 
1. will strengthen soutnern Arrican region t=US 
pop. 11L11ZI m> = selr-t~ellant, lntegt~ated economy, 
s 1 ze, 
2.no longer engage in downward sp1ra1l1ng compe~e~ion 
w1th Ub workers;~ insteao =market for liLl X present 
1mports from Ub = mutually beneficial. 
B. Conclus1on: US wot~ket~s, 1nclud1ng lndustr~ial and 
set~vice wor~ket~s, suppot~t SA democt~atic rot~ces~ and 
ne1ghbor1ng coun~r1es 1 efforts to achieve change: 
i.Support sasnctions now, end US role in Angola 
2.Br1ng pressure to bear on US government: 
a. Show l1nks to welfare of US peopole 
b. establish every poss1ble k1nd of l1nK w1th 
unions, commun1ty in SA = work for mutually 
benef1cial contt~ols on tNCs, lmpt~oved wages, 
work1ng and liv1ng condltions. 
